Introduction
There are many theories on the demographic development the countries. Some theories (for example, the Second Demographic Transition Theory) postulate that, with demographic modernisation, demographic behaviours of people from different regions of the world will converge. For example, people will experience the transition to adulthood in an increasingly similar fashion: it will become "late, protracted and complex" (Billari & Liefbroer 2010 ). Other scientists believe that different countries will never converge in their demographic behaviours, and the transition to adulthood will always have a specific of a region.
We believe that most countries are experiencing demographic modernisation, whose main result would be a de-standardisation of people's life courses (Bertaux & Kohli 1984; Mayer & Müller 1986) . The goal of a secular, non-authoritarian society is to let people realise their intentions (including in the demographic sphere), which will lead to a diversity of biographies.
Nevertheless, there are some very important factors that will shape people's life courses and the transition to adulthood in similar ways across countries. Humanity started to live longer, so we do not have this pressure to live life as quickly and efficiently as possible. Now we have the luxury to postpone important events and even to decline them altogether (e.g. living child-free). Modern jobs require more skills, so we have to study longer and postpone entering the job market.
Urbanisation, which parallels demographic modernisation, gives us anonymity, contraception and greater access to education and jobs, all of which lead to the postponement of and even the decline in childbearing. Finally, the main achievement of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) is the separation of matrimonial, sexual and reproductive behaviours; this separation leads to the appearance of partnerships and the postponement of marriages and childbearing.
In total, these factors will delay the transition to adulthood and make it more protracted (as Billari et al. argue) ; the ultimate question is how the transition to adulthood will look when demographic modernisation ends. The main questions today concern what is going on in these countries right now and how different these countries are from one another today.
We took three countries from one region, Europe, but with different histories of demographic changes, and tested several hypotheses considering the main patterns in the transition to adulthood: sequencing, timing and tempo of the occurrence of events marking the transition. We wanted to test whether the modernisation paths in these three countries are converging (as the Second Demographic Transition Theory predicts) or remain unique.
Theoretical background: transition to adulthood
The conceptualisation of a stage between childhood and adulthood appeared only in the 20 th century. Human longevity started to increase intensively, and a new stage began to appear. The transition to adulthood (i.e. late adolescence, early adulthood, young adulthood or emerging adulthood) is the stage of the life course when individuals experience biological, emotional, cognitive and social maturation (Steinberg 2001; Grob 2001 ).
The first scientific discipline which started to consider life as a course and discovered a transition to adulthood as a new life stage was psychology. Psychologists noticed that childhood today lasts longer than it did before, and that it is not so heterogeneous anymore. They offered a concept of a new life stage between childhood and adulthood. In 1904, Hal invented "adolescence" as a scientific term (Hall 1904) . He assumed that the heterochronism of the physical and psychological maturation of young people might become a dilemma for society. Youngsters are in the middle between children and adults, but do not belong to either group; that is why we do not have a clear understanding of their position in the social structure, their roles and their aims. During the 20 th century, many psychologists offered their own concepts explaining the mechanisms of maturation. Some of them proved that the development of a person depends on biological factors:
the genetic programme of a body (Werner 1926; Fröbel & Jarvis 1899) , the psychological makeup of a person (Jaensch 1925; Eysenck & Rachman 1967; Lorenz 1963) , reactions to physical transformation during maturation (Offer 1984) or the unconscious of an individual (Freud 1936; Freud & Freud 2001) . Some psychologists have thought that maturation is a purely psychological phenomenon. The fuel for the transition from childhood to adulthood is aspiration towards independence, individuality (Spranger 1925; Blos 1967 ) and self-realisation (Buhler 1971) . Other psychologists considered the mind a "tabula rasa" (Petryszak 1981) , and the development of individuality falls under the influence of society. The aim of a person during the transition to adulthood is to gain the role repertoire (Hofstätter 1959) , to form the competencies in new spheres of life (Heitmeyer & Hurrelmann 1988) or to complete developmental-age tasks (Mead 1934; Lazarus 1966; Havighurst 1972) .
Some other psychologists were trying to combine several types of factors. Piaget thought the biological ability to theorise, which appears around age 12-15, let people shape the image of their future lives and understand what they want to achieve (Ginsburg & Opper 1969) . Gesell suggested that genetics define the tempo, i.e. the sequence and timing of maturation's components, but society lets a person unlock his or her potential (Gesell, Ilg & Ames 1956 ). Lewin thought that the level of stress and aggression during maturation could be explained by the difference in requirements for a child and an adult in society: the greater the difference, the greater the stress (Lewin 1935) . The successfulness of the formation of identity through the experience of age crises determines how well a person can be socialised (Erikson 1956) . A very influential Life Span Development theory (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade 1998; Smelser & Baltes 2001, pp.8844-8848; Baltes, Staudinger & Lindenberger 2002) postulates that the development of a person continues throughout the life course and is influenced by many cultural, societal and individual factors.
Arnett divided the transition to adulthood into two parts: "emerging adulthood" (18-30 years) and "young adulthood" (30-50 years) (Arnett 2000 (Arnett , 2003 (Arnett , 2007 Tanner & Arnett 2009; Arnett 2012) . He conducted surveys which showed that people did not consider certain events in life as markers of the transition. They paid more attention to their own perception themselves as adults. Arnett's ideas are actively discussed by demographers (Liefbroer & Toulemont 2010) . We need stronger criteria than just a sense of self as an adult, however. Moreover, events and selfperception are tied together: a person cannot achieve full financial or physical independence without getting a job. Without important events (e.g. a relationship, education, or a job) it is very hard to develop as an individual, to gain a social status and experience. We admit the importance of the psychological feeling of being an adult, but the role of life course events is still very important for society and the person.
We listed several psychological theories to show how complex and ambiguous the phenomenon of transition to adulthood is. Even the science which first started to study maturation cannot fully describe and explain the mechanisms of this process. We can summarise that a lot of psychological, biographical and environmental aspects influence our development; that transition to adulthood is one of the most rapid and important changes in the human life, psyche and body; that it has its own structure and the parts of maturation (physical, psychological, social) can be heterochronous; and that no one knows for certain the criteria or age of the start and end of the transition to adulthood. This phenomenon is still understudied.
Sociologists and demographers started to study the transition to adulthood in the second half of the 20 th century. After the youth movements and rebellions in 1968, sociologists realised the power of this new social and age group. To understand youngsters better, sociologists needed to investigate this life stage's main process-the achievement of adult social roles and statuses. These ideas were actively explored by Sociology of Life Course Approach. The Life Course Approach also came from psychology and only in 1960s started to be adopted by sociologists and demographers. Its main idea is that human development extends across the whole life course (Elder Jr. 1975; Elder Jr. & Giele 1998) . There are several factors shaping the life courses of people:
individual development (human agency), history (location in time), culture (location in place), social relations (linked lives) and timing (age, period and cohort intersection). The development of the life course runs parallel with demographic modernisation: the life courses of people are becoming more diverse, de-institutionalised, de-standardised and individualised (Bertaux & Kohli 1984; Mayer & Müller 1986 ). There are still some norms and cultural age deadlines in societies that continue to influence people's behaviour (Hagestad & Neugarten 1985) , but these norms are becoming internalised, subjective and more flexible (Billari & Liefbroer 2010) . Institutional arrangements also influence the behaviour of people, particularly national cultural features and the welfare state (Buchmann 1989; Esping-Andersen 2007) . The Life Course concept encompasses the term "transition to adulthood", the topic of interest. This term reflects very well the nature of the process: adolescence is not some fact or event -it is a set of events which has very flexible requirements for the presence of the events, their order, tempo and age of occurrence. There is no specific age range for the transition to adulthood. Researchers operationalise this construct on the basis of the culture and specific social group which they investigate.
Demographers started to study the transition to adulthood because of their own motives: to make conclusions about changes in demographic behaviour, we need to wait until all the members of a cohort leave the age under the risk of event occurrence. The first life-course events usually occur during the first third of life, so we may make some comparisons of real behaviour even when new generations have not reached midlife.
There is greater consensus among demographers on what is included in the transition to adulthood because the list of life-course events is much shorter than the list of psychological phenomena. Nowadays, a lot of researchers agree that the following list of sociodemographic events mark the transition to adulthood: first leaving the parental home, completing education, entering the work force, first cohabitation (or partnership), first marriage and the birth of the first child (Billari & Liefbroer 2010; Billari et al. 2005; Buchmann 1989; Liefbroer 1999) .
The theory of the Second Demographic Transition presented the idea that if economic success of some countries can be repeated by other countries, the same can be done with demographic modernisation (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995) . There are several indicators of demographic modernisation which influence the transition to adulthood; for one, the postponement of marriages and childbearing lead to the postponement of the transition to adulthood (Billari & Liefbroer 2010; Puur et al. 2012) . People choose cohabitations instead of marriages and non-marital childbearing instead of marital, so we need to deal with new forms of old behaviours. The patterns of the transition to adulthood change in both quantitative (tempo and timing) and qualitative (sequencing) vectors. Billari and Liefbroer supposed that we are moving from the old pattern of the transition to adulthood ("early, contracted and simple") towards the new one ("late, protracted and complex") (Billari & Liefbroer 2010) . This is how they described a new pattern: "a relatively early exit from the parental home, followed by time spent living without a partner, entry into a nonmarital union, the birth of a first child (at a relatively "late" age) and marriage occurring either late (just before or after entry into parenthood) or not at all". They also assumed a convergence of the patterns of becoming an adult in different countries, but could not find compelling evidence of this for European countries.
The divergence of the transition to adulthood and other aspects of demographic behaviour can be explained by the following: the behaviour of people in different countries depends on the institutional arrangements and cultural traditions, and, because of that, the convergence of behaviours will never be achieved. In 1965, Hajnal proposed the concept now known as the Hajnal line, which runs from Trieste to St. Petersburg (Hajnal 1965 There are some more theories which seek to identify regional patterns of demographic behaviour. Buchmann argues that there are different rules and norms in different societies which regulate the timing of the occurrence of life-course events. In some countries, individualism has a stronger influence, whereas in others, institutions are more important in shaping biographical strategies (Buchmann 1989) . Many system theories from all the aforementioned disciplines posit that all levels matter: macro (state), meso (family and community) and micro (individual) (Bronfenbrenner 2009; Hendry & Kloep 2012, pp.28-31; Carr 2009, pp.134-135) . We agree that while countries have political, cultural, religious, institutional and other differences, we can expect that, even if they start to move in one direction, we still will notice many qualitative or quantitative differences. Up to this point, young people around the globe are becoming closer to each other in their views and aspirations because of the Internet, but national borders and norms still cause many differences. Let us look closer at the institutional arrangements in Europe and their influence of the transition to adulthood.
Reher divided Europe into north and south. The north tends to exhibit relatively weak family ties and early ages of leaving the parental home. The south shows stronger family ties and later ages of leaving the parental home (Reher 1998 Our position that each country has its own path of development, but some trends are so strong and unavoidable that the convergence is inevitable. Of course, the speeds of change and specific patterns will be different, but modernisation is a common process: life expectancy is increasing, life stages are lasting longer, life-changing events are being postponed, the occurrence of events is becoming less predictable, the sequences are becoming more diverse, the number of tracks and options is growing and new forms of families and parenting are appearing. We cannot deny that all modern countries experience the listed changes. What is different is only the niceties.
Thus, in our research, we expect to see similar trends of changes in transition to adulthood in France, Estonia and Russia, but we also expect to see delays in modernisation in Estonia and Russia and some country-specific qualities.
Why these three countries?
While However, we still do not know whether this is but an effect of the fall of the iron curtain or means that Russians and Europeans are really not as different as we expected.
These three countries are similar enough to have common patterns in the transition to adulthood, but at the same time, they exhibit some unexpected uniqueness in their development and history. France is a typical European country: a pioneer of social, economic and demographic modernisation. Estonia was part of the USSR for 50 years and has a large Russian-speaking population. Russia is a slowly modernising (in demographic terms) country in comparison with its European neighbours.
We expect that not all of the patterns of transition to adulthood (sequencing, timing and tempo) will show the same dynamics in these three countries. We expect the most modern demographic behaviour from the French ("late, protracted and complex"). We think that modern generations of Estonians will tend to behave more European rather than Soviet or Russian, but will be somewhere in the middle between France and Russia. We expect Russia will exhibit the most traditional patterns of socioeconomic behaviour ("early, contracted and simple") in comparison with the two other countries.
Operationalisation of the transition to adulthood
We define a transition to adulthood as a complex process which consists of changes in biological, emotional, cognitive and social components of an individual. As social scientists, we will omit the first three aspects and will focus on the social (i.e. sociodemographic) aspect of the transition to adulthood. In this case, we understand a transition to adulthood as a sequence of status transitions (or life-course events), which open the biography of an individual in different spheres of life: professional career, family building, independent living, etc.
We decided to divide the life-course events marking transition to adulthood into two groups:
demographic events and socioeconomic events. Altogether, we will call them sociodemographic events. This separation of events is important for our study, because, on the one hand, it will allow us to compare socioeconomic and demographic events (their timing and tempo), and, on the other hand, we will be able to discover which goes first and which goes last (sequencing).
Demographic events comprise first partnership, first marriage and birth of the first child. We define first partnership as an unregistered union and the first marriage as a registered union. The surveys we used define partnership as a union based on shared-space living arrangements lasting at least three months.
Socioeconomic events comprise completion of education, first job and separation from parents. By "first job", the surveys we used imply a work arrangement lasting at least six months.
By "separation from parents" (or "leaving the parental home"), the surveys imply the first time when a respondent left his or her parents for at least three months.
We can also call all the events "starting events", though we know that finishing education is not a starting event in itself. However, in the chain of events marking the transition to adulthood, finishing education plays a starting role, because it allows the start of a career -the means to earn a consistent and livable income and become financially independent. It is very hard to start a career without finishing at least some level of education. Moreover, we will explain in the Data section why we study only the events occurring before age 35, but since almost all the generations in our survey passed the age of 35, we can use the information about their education as a finished event, which will not change over time.
Hypotheses
In this paper, we want to test whether the changes in sociodemographic behaviours in France, Estonia and Russia are occurring according to the SDT (i.e. there is a convergence in behaviours) or are following less predictable patterns as other scientists expect (Buchmann, Reher and Esping-Andersen, inter alia).
We formulate the following hypotheses:
H1. The transition to adulthood differs among countries.
H1.1. France will have more modern sociodemographic behaviour than other countries (in terms of the SDT).
H1.2. Russia will have more traditional sociodemographic behaviour than other countries (in terms of the SDT).
H1.3. Estonia will be between France and Russia.
H2. The transition to adulthood differs among generations.
H2.1. The oldest generations in France will strongly differ from the generations in Estonia and Russia.
H2.2. The oldest generations in Estonia and Russia will behave very similarly due to their common status as Soviet republics.
H2.3. The younger generations in Estonia will be more similar to those of France than to those of Russia because of the dissolution of the USSR and the Estonians' pivot to the European behavioural model.
H2.4. The changes across generations will show that all three countries are experiencing the similar path of modernisation, but at different speeds and with some country-specific qualities.
H3. The transition to adulthood differs between sexes.
H3.1. Men in all three countries will show more modernised behaviour than women; men will pay more attention to their careers, and women will pay more attention to demographic events.
H3.2. The difference between men and women will be starker in Russia and less visible in France and Estonia.
Data and analytical approach
All the classic indicators of demographic behaviour have a big problem: censoring of events.
The measures of central tendency for young people would be shifted to the younger ages because they would represent only people who already experienced an event, so people who postponed an event, would be seen by such measures only after some unknown count of years.
The set of methods which deals well with censoring is event history -or survival -analysis.
Usually, researchers create Cox regressions or Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for each event and compare median ages or quartiles of survivor functions. The main disadvantage of such methods is that we can analyse one or, at most, two events in one model. Moreover, if we include two events in a model, we should remember that both of them need to happen before the interview (Billari, 2001b) .
The transition to the study of event chains makes it possible to achieve a new level of understanding of the structure of individuals' lives. An advanced method known as Sequence Analysis (SA) helps demographers and sociologists to achieve this aim (Abbott and Tsay, 2000; Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2007, 2010; Billari, 2001a; Billari and Piccarreta, 2005) . SA allows researchers to study the timing (i.e. the age at which events are experienced), the sequencing (i.e.
order) and the quantum of events (i.e. observed number of events) (Billari et al., 2006) .
We used several descriptive techniques of SA to analyse the biographies of French, Estonians and Russians: chronograms, the durations of statuses and the frequencies of subsequences on tables.
We presume that the interval between ages 15 and 35 is very appropriate for studying the transition to adulthood. The age of 15 is the standard age of the start of reproductive behaviour. The age of 35 was chosen as the "upper boundary" of the transition to adulthood because our investigations for Russia (Mitrofanova, 2016; Mitrofanova and Artamonova, 2016) showed that by the age of 35, most Russians have almost all the first events. We also suppose that Europeans tend to have at least socioeconomic events by this age (Ferrari & Pailhé 2016; Rahnu, Puur & Sakkeus 2016; Blum, Sebille & Zakharov 2009; ). We did not want to widen the interval more because, for the Soviet generations, the starting events after age 35 seems to be too marginal.
We used harmonised datasets of the first waves of the French, Estonian and Russian "Generations and Gender Surveys" (GGS) (Perelli-Harris et al. 2009 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 Estonians do not so actively leave parents (only 70-80%), and the dynamic varies a lot depending on the generation and sex. Men and women born in the 1930s and 1940s differed a lot (about 80% of men left home, but only 60-70% of women did), other generations are leaving parents in a more uniform way. More than 80% of respondents born in the 1950s and 1960s separated from their parents, whereas the share among the youngest generation is 66% for men and 78% for women.
Among Russians, almost 100% of the respondents from soviet generations left their parental home, whereas modern generations exhibit a lower share -about 90%.
There is much greater variation in starting demographic behaviour. The share of French people who have at least one partnership has risen from older to youngest generations, from 22% to 74% for men and from 19% to 79% for women. The share for Estonians has also risen, but to a lesser degree: from 33% to 64% for men and from 25% to 72% for women. The intergenerational change among Russians is the smallest: from 27% to 47% for men and from 25% to 47% for women.
The trend in marriages is opposite that of partnerships: the share of people having at least one marriage declines from older generations to the youngest. The decline is from 87% to 35% for men and from 83% to 43% for women in France, from 93% to 33% for men and from 91% to 45%
for women in Estonia and from 92% to 62% for men and from 85% to 72% for women in Russia.
French and Estonian respondents started from slightly different shares, but the behaviour of the youngest generations is almost the same. The youngest Russian generation differs much more from those of the two other countries than from the older Russian generations.
Regarding childbearing, the common trend in all three countries is also a decline. Of course, we need to remember that the youngest respondents are only 25, and they have a lot of time to realise their reproductive and matrimonial intentions, so we cannot say that young people refuse to get married and to have children, because it may be just a postponing of demographic events.
However, the shares declined to the following degrees, respectively, for men and women: for French people from 86% to 50% and from 87% to 63%, for Estonians from 89% to 54% and from 91% to 72% and for Russians from 90% to 61% and from 92% to 82%. The shares for men do not differ dramatically, but the shares for women show that childbearing occurs earlier in Russia than in two other countries, and childbearing in Estonia occurs earlier than in France. In Estonia, the picture is different. We observe a decrease in almost all the median ages of demographic events across generations. If the oldest men started partnerships at the age of 24 and marriages a year later, and had their first children at the age of 26, the youngest men start following the same path two years earlier. The same goes for women: the oldest generations started partnerships and marriages at around 23 and had their first children one year later, whereas youngsters start partnerships at the age 20, start marriages at around 21 and bear children at 22. The ages of socioeconomic events stabilised at around age 18 for leaving parents and age 19 for completing education. We do not observe strong differences in socioeconomic behaviours between sexes, but the difference in demographic behaviour exists: men are obtaining all these events about two years later than women.
In Russia, the situation is similar to that in Estonia: we observe a fall in median ages. The oldest men started partnerships and marriages at around age 24 and had their first child at 26, while the youngest men start unions at 22 and have their first child one year later. It is the same for women: the oldest generation started unions at 22 and began childbearing at 23, while the youngsters had these events two years earlier. To compare the behaviour of the French, Estonians and Russians, we also used Sequence Analysis, which allows us to depict the trajectories of respondents. In Table 1 , we present how events were combined into statuses and which colour palette was used for which group of statuses.
Grey was used for censored events (when a respondent is too young to have enough time to obtain all the events which are desired). Censored events Figure 3 shows the chronograms for men and women in France, Estonia and Russia.
Chronograms show the shares of people (Y-axis) with certain statuses at each point in time (Xaxis). We used the ages of our respondents as the time point, so the X-axis represents the period of life from age 15 to age 35. The dates collected are accurate to the month, so the transitions from year to year in the chronograms are very smooth.
For our analysis, we used only events which commence demographic and socioeconomic trajectories. For example, for the first partnership or marriage we only used the dates when unions started and did not use the dates of the dissolution of unions. Thus, the chronograms show the fact of each trajectory's inception, but not the development of each trajectory.
At first glance, Figure 3 shows the colours changing gradually from France to Russia.
France has a lot of pink and red colours and less dark green; Estonia has less pink and red and more dark green; Russia has almost no vivid pink and red, but a lot of dark green. Looking back at the colour palette, we see that pink and red represent the partnerships without and with children respectively; the prevailing shade of dark green in Figure 3 means that people have marriage, a child and socioeconomic events, the first of which was leaving parents.
In the chronograms for France, many of the colours are distributed evenly. The green palette takes more space, but not as much as for the other countries. This means that, in France, the behaviour of people is more diverse: they can live in partnerships or in marriages with or without children. In Estonia and Russia, however, people behave more similarly by having, nearly exclusively, a marriage and at least one child. Partnerships are extremely rare in Russia, even when respondents are young. The exact shares of each status at ages 15, 25 and 35 are represented in Appendix 2. We deleted the rows where the shares in all cells were less than 1%. We also prepared Age 25 is in a period when young people are actively trying new social roles, looking for a place in society and in the labour market and experimenting in personal life and preparing to start families. The comparison of demographic behaviour gives us very interesting, but expected results.
Men
The share of single people is at least 10% higher for men than for women in every country; and among the countries the highest shares are in France (42% for men and 27% for women), the lowest are in Russia (34% for men and 22.5% for women). If a person registered as single, it does not mean he or she has never had a love relationship -it just means that they never lived together for at least three months and have not got married.
The shares of people who have experienced cohabitation differs dramatically among countries: about 22% of French respondents had already had at least one partner by age 25; the same indicator for Estonians is about 15%; for Russians, it is 8%. The situation for marriages is opposite: the lowest share is in France, the highest in Russia. The interesting thing is that marriages differ between sexes: there are 15% more women in marriages than men for each country.
Childbearing looks even more uneven between men and women because the sex difference is already 20% in each country. We can assume that even in France women tend to start a family and give birth to a child at the healthiest reproductive ages. Men seem not to feel such pressure, so they can and do postpone demographic events.
The shares of people who do not have any experience in the socioeconomic sphere has fallen below 5%, but the preferences for the first event vary, albeit not greatly: 67% of French people prefer to finish education first, with only 30% leaving parents before completing education;
Estonians have the same priorities (57% finishing education first, 36% leaving parents first);
Russian men also prefer to finish education first (49% versus 44% of those who left parents first).
Only Russian women tend to leave parents first (54% versus 40% of those who finished education first). As Russian women are starting families very early (in comparison with the two other countries), they may be traditional in other aspects: they may, for instance, leave their parental home when they get married and begin life in the husband's family. Marriages are more evenly distributed among countries and sexes at age 35: 56% of men and 60% of women are in marriages in France; 63% of men and 68% of women are in marriages in Estonia; and 64% of men and 68% of women are in marriages in Russia. Estonians and Russians are very close to each other in this regard. France has smaller shares, but only by 8%, and it looks like a postponement, rather than a complete refusal, of marriages. The decline in the share of married women in Russia is explained by the growth of people with censored events.
Childbearing is very close to marriages in its dynamics and shares: 62% of men and 68% of women in France have at least one child by the age of 35; 65% of men and 72% of women in Estonia also have a childbearing experience; among Russians, these shares are 65% for men and 72% for women. Estonians and Russians are comparable again, whereas French respondents fall short by just 3-4%.
The behaviour of our respondents shows that socioeconomic events are the most vital for young people, who achieve these events most actively between ages 15 and 25. For most people, except Russian women, the first event is the completion of education; Russian women prefer to leave their parents first.
The set of demographic events is less important during this first 10-year period. Only women, especially in Russia, tend to start a family as early as possible (and it relates to leaving parents), whereas men are not so burdened by this question during the first half of the transition to adulthood. That is why the second half of the transition to adulthood is more demographic, especially for men. When some economic stability is achieved, people more intensively get married and give birth to a child. This increase is easily discernible among French men: the share of fathers increased from 26% at age 25 to 62% at age 35. Figure 4 shows chronograms for each country, sex and generation. The white dashed line on the chronograms shows the ages at which people start to experience censoring: age 25 for Russians, 25-26 for Estonians and 26 for French people. We did not show the censored data (grey colour) on these chronograms, so it would be visible how many people among those older than 25 experienced different events.
The exact shares of each status at the ages of 15, 25 and 35 are represented in Appendix 3
(the rows with shares below 3% were deleted). The accumulated shares of events (as in Table 2 ) are in Appendix 4.
In Figure 4 , we can see when all the behavioural shifts started. Let's start with socioeconomic behaviour.
The lightest blue indicates the status "no events". We can see a distinct trend in this colour among French people: at the age of 15, less than half of the oldest generations had this status, and the other half had some other events, namely the completion of education; among the modern French people, the share of "eventless" increased by more than 80%. Among Estonians, the growth of "eventless" people at age 15 started at a 75% share and reached a 94% share in the youngest generations. As a "competing" event, Estonians also mostly have the completion of education. For
Russians, the share of people who have no events at age 15 was 93% for men and 91% for women and reached 94% and 95%, respectively, in the youngest generations. Thus, for French people, we can clearly see the postponement of events, mainly the finishing of education. For Estonians, the changes are not so dramatic, but the postponement is also vivid. For Russians, the situation is very different because people postponed events even in the oldest generations.
Among French people, the share of youngsters who finished their education before they left their parents decreased in comparison with older people: the drop was 13% for men and 30% for women. This is a very big loss, but we think it indicates a positive change: people started to study longer. Among Estonian men, we observe a 19% increase in this share; among women, we see a decrease by 13%. The phenomenon of different changes can be explained by different requirements of men and women in the labour market and society. Among Russians, we observe an increase for men by 15% and an increase for women by 5%.
All the respondents who left their parents before finishing education mostly did so before age 25. The share of French men who prefer leaving parents first hovered around 25-30% among generations born in 1930-1969; modern men leave parents more actively: by age 25, the share is already 37%. Only 15% of the oldest generation of French women preferred leaving parents first, whereas among the youngest women this number is three times higher. We can scarcely say that French women are becoming more traditional and leaving their parents to live with their husbands' families. More likely, French women are becoming more economically independent, and they may rent an apartment alone, with a friend or with a boyfriend.
For Estonian respondents, the results fluctuate considerably: the biggest share of people who preferred to leave parents first belongs to the 1940s generation of men (44% at age 25) and to the 1960s generation of women (47% at age 25). For men, the share declined after this point, and for women the share increased from the oldest generations. The dynamics for young Estonian men and women are opposite: men tend to finish education first whereas women tend to leave their parents first.
In Russia, the intergenerational tendencies differ from those of the other countries. In the oldest generations, the share of people who left parents before finishing education was 50% for both sexes. It is a very high share in comparison with France and Estonia; we believe it resulted from the political, social and economic environments of the USSR in the middle of last century. Phenomena composing these environments were the following: (1) continuous urbanisation stimulated young and active people's movement from rural parental homes to study or work in cities; (2) there were abundant opportunities to get a flat from the government; (3) there were several instruments of forced migration, such as military service, compulsory assignment to work after study and work mobilisation for "large-scale development projects" (e.g. the Baikal-Amur Mainline); (4) gender roles still were very traditional in much of society, so women tended to marry at young ages and move from the parental home to the husband's home. All these reasons can lead to a situation in which half of the generation separated from parents in early ages and before other events. Things started to change in the most modern generations: 36% of men born in the 1970s (in comparison with 50% from the oldest generation) left their parents before finishing education; 48% of modern women, in comparison with 53-58% from soviet generations, left their parents first. We think this decline among men may be the result of a declining share of men serving in the army. The whole decline for both sexes may be linked to the fact that it became much harder to obtain one's own flat -people can either buy or rent one, so they need financial recourses which may be unavailable at young ages. However, in comparison with other countries, Russian women separate from their parents very intensively. We can assume that this is because some patterns of traditional marital behaviour are still common among women.
Let's describe now the changes in demographic behaviour. The shares of single people (all shades of two blue palettes) are shrinking for the youngest people. This can be explained by the growth of partnerships (pink and red), because the legitimisation of partnerships permit cohabitation.
The shift from marriages to partnerships began in the generation born in the 1950s in France, in the generations born in the 1950s and 1960s in Estonia and in the generations born in the 1960s and 1970s in Russia. Again, we see a progression starting in France and moving to Estonia and then Russia.
As socioeconomic events, partnerships have their peak around age 25.Among the French, the growth in the share of cohabiting people at age 25 was from almost 3% for the oldest generation to 44% for men and 47% for women of the youngest generations, so the actual growth is more than 15 times! For Estonians, the trend is from 6% to 33% for young men and to 39% for young women.
For Russians, the change is from 4% to 16% for men and from 5% to 14% for women. The largest growth is in France, whereas the growth in Russia is very small.
The peak in marriages occurs around age 35. At age 25, the share of those who married among French men of the oldest generation was 51%; among those of the youngest generation, it was 11%. At age 35, the numbers are 83% in the oldest generation versus 49% in the 1960s generation 4 . Among French men, the decrease is very dramatic, but among French women it is less pronounced: from 65% at the age of 25 in the oldest generation to 23% in the youngest generation; from 81% at age 35 in the oldest generation to 60% in the 1960s generation. Among Estonians are the same shares for men at age 25: 44% versus 23%; at age 35, they are 88% versus 69%. For women, the shares are 61% versus 36% and 88% versus 76%. For Russian men, the proportions are 53% versus 48% and 87% versus 76%; for women, they are 65% versus 63% and 82% versus 82%.
The shares of married people in the oldest generation are almost the same across the three countries, but the shares of married people in the youngest generations differ a lot, especially at age 25.
Marriage in France is commonly postponed until the second half of the transition to adulthood, and even there it drops a lot. The biggest changes are observed among French men, whereas Russian women demonstrate almost no changes.
The unions without children (pink for partnerships and first green palette for marriages) are changing their type from generation to generation. If, in older generations, people prefer to register marriage even if they did not have children, modern people prefer partnership as a first and childless union. At this point, only France and Estonia demonstrate this change clearly. In Russia, this transformation has only just begun.
Childbearing increases more slowly than marriages. One of the reasons is the growth of extramarital childbearing (Appendix 5 contains exact shares). The red palette represents partnerships with at least one child, and the second green palette represent marriages with at least one child. Childbearing in singlehood was not popular among the older generations of French people and Russians and loses its attractiveness even more among young people. The shares at age 35 decreased from 4% to 2-3% for men and from 9-10% to 3-4% for women. For Estonians, the share of childbirth in singlehood at age 25 increased from 0-2% to 2-3%, but almost disappeared by age 35. People prefer to have children in unions.
The share of childbearing in partnerships decreased considerably among French people. At the age of 25, only 2% of the oldest generations had children in partnerships, whereas for the 1970s 4 We cannot adequately compare the oldest generation with the youngest at the age of 35 because of censoring, so at the age of 35 we just compare the oldest generation with those born in the 1960s.
generation this share grew to 7%. At the age of 35, the share of the oldest generation was 2%, and the share of the 1960s generation was 25%. Among French women, the growth at age 25 is from 1% to 13% and, at age 35, from 2% to 22%. Thus, the shares of French men and women giving a birth to a child in partnership increased 10 times, which coincides with the rise of partnerships and indicates that people perceive partnerships as an alternative to marriages.
For Estonians, the growth was from 1% among the oldest generation at age 25 to 14% for the youngest; from 2% for the oldest generation at age 35 to 16% for the 1960s generation. For women, the change was from 3% to 22% and from 4% to 13%, respectively. For Russian men, the growth was from 1% to 4% and from 3% to 7%; for Russian women, it was from 3% to 9% and from 4% to 6%. The behaviour of Estonians is much closer to that of the French, rather than to the behaviour of Russians. The rise of childbearing in partnerships in Estonia and Russia has the same tempo as the rise of partnerships themselves, which means that people who choose this type of union perceive it as an alternative to marriage.
The opposite trend is visible in marriages: aside from Russian women, all other groups in our study demonstrate a decrease in births in wedlock. This decrease also coincides with the decrease in marriages themselves, so the biggest drop we observe is for French men. 
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Discussion of results
We tested all the hypotheses. Not all of them were confirmed, however. Young people are starting families at ages 20-23, but they obtain socioeconomic events at age 18.
The interval between all socioeconomic and all demographic events is about five years for men and three years for women. The interval between leaving the parental home and becoming a parent is six years for men and four years for women. Thus, the timing of the onset of events in Estonia is more similar to that of Russia, but the tempo and the sequencing is closer to that of France.
H2. The transition to adulthood differs among generations.
H2.1. The oldest generations in France are more similar to those in Estonia and Russia than we expected: the chronograms look very similar, and the median ages are quite close to each other. Nevertheless, the median ages of demographic events in Estonia were still much closer to those of Russia than to those of France.
H2.2. The oldest generations in Estonia and
H2.4. The changes across generations showed that all three countries are experiencing similar paths of modernisation, but at different speeds and with some country-based peculiarities.
The chronograms clearly showed that the way biographies are changing is very similar across all three countries, but the median ages demonstrated the remained differences in timing of events.
H3. The transition to adulthood differs between sexes.
H3.1. Men in all three countries exhibited more modernised behaviour than women: the difference in median ages in all the countries showed that men are delaying the onset of demographic behaviour by at least two years in comparison with women. Men payed more attention to career when women payed more attention to demographic events: the mean ages confirmed that the sex difference in the occurrence of socioeconomic events is minimal, and the difference in the occurrence of demographic events showed that women care more about family formation. This is probably due to the strong association between pregnancy at young ages and infant health.
H3.2. The difference between men and women is not strong in Russia and less visible in
France and Estonia. We disprove this hypothesis, because the sex difference in all the countries is about two years.
We disproved some of our hypotheses and discovered that the convergence in sequences is apparent in all three countries, whereas the timing and tempo did not show such results. We revealed that Estonia and Russia are still close in the timing of the occurrence of events, but the tempo is uniform in Estonia and France.
We also were surprised by such young median ages of the occurrence of demographic events in Estonia and Russia. We should remember that the youngest respondents were only 25 years old, and not all of them had the full set of first events at the time of the survey. We still can explain the decrease in median ages thus: the generations of the 1960s and 1970s, who socialised mostly in the Soviet era, did not show any behavioural modernisation. They started social changes, the result of which we can see in the following generations, but they did not have the opportunity to realise their intentions: contraceptives were not available in Soviet times; unmarried people could not rent an apartment or a hotel room; people could work only at official and prescribed jobs because of the law on parasitism (1961-1991); they could not choose where to work after finishing their education because of compulsory assignment to work after study ; and they were forced to have children at younger ages because of indirect restrictions on sexual activity, social pressure and the tax on childlessness .
The Estonian generations of the 1970s showed a more rapid transition to modernised behaviour, because people finally felt free of the USSR's control and turned sharply to European norms and institutions. The changes in Russia are occurring much more slowly, because Russia is still very far from Europe and is much bigger and more heterogeneous than Estonia. The case of Estonia is very peculiar, and we will continue studying this country. It should be interesting to divide the Estonians by ethnicity and compare the sociodemographic behaviours of ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians in Estonia. We expect that the first group will have more European patterns of behaviour (i.e. more like France), whereas the second group's behaviour will be similar to what we see in Russia.
Conclusion
We tested several hypotheses considering the timing, tempo and sequencing of the events marking the transition to adulthood in France, Estonia and Russia. Our analysis revealed that the Hajnal line theory has more evidence behind it than the Second Demographic Transition Theory.
We can see that the changes in these three countries generally go in one direction (towards a "late, protracted and complex" transition to adulthood), but the patterns that most modern generations demonstrate still return us to a Western vs. Eastern European nuptial and reproductive model:
marriages and childbearing are occurring in Russia and Estonia at much younger ages and among a bigger share of the population than in France.
We can confirm the assumption of the de-standardisation of people's life courses which many scientists expected (Bertaux & Kohli 1984; Mayer & Müller 1986 ). In the case of France, Estonia and Russia, the main factor of the increase in the variety of life-course tracks is the appearance of a new type of matrimonial behaviour -partnership.
We will continue our investigation using even younger cohorts from the second and third waves of the Russian GGS. We think that the generation born in the 1980s should demonstrate much more modern demographic behaviour than their predecessors because they were the first youngsters who did not experience Soviet life in their formative years.
Estonians (Luule Sakkeus, Allan Puur, Leen Rahnu). Special thanks to Thomas H. Espy for his aid in the preparation of this paper.
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